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Abstract—This paper discusses mechanisms to identify 
dishonest users of services provided by a server in environments 
where identities of honest users must be kept as their secrets. An 
anonymous token based mechanism enables the server to identify 
dishonest users when dishonest events are detected while the 
users are receiving services, and a homomorhic anonymous token 
based one enables that even dishonest events can be detected only 
after the server completed their services and the users had left 
from the server. A linear equation based encryption algorithm 
that is used for implementing the above methods is also enhanced. 
Keywords—anonymous tokens, homomorphic anonymous 
tokens, dishonest event, dishonest entities, linear equation based 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Let entity S be a server that provides anonymous clients 
with its services. In this setting, although S can 
authenticate anonymous clients and collect fees for its 
providing services from the clients by using mechanisms 
for anonymous authentication [2][3] and credit card 
systems [4], it cannot protect itself from dishonest 
behaviors of clients once it had authenticated them as 
authorized ones. If S’s service is to exhibit art objects to 
visitors for example, visitors that had been anonymously 
authenticated successfully by showing their tickets may 
break exhibits or steal them; however, S cannot impute its 
damages to anyone because visitors are anonymous. S 
may be able to identify liable visitors if it inquires all 
possible visitors of their alibis, but this solution is 
apparently not acceptable because privacies of even 
honest visitors are revealed. 
This paper proposes 2 mechanisms to enable server S to 
identify dishonest clients in the above environments 
without revealing identities of honest clients. The 1st 
mechanism is based on anonymous tokens and enables S 
to identify dishonest clients when dishonest events are 
detected during they are receiving services, and the 2nd 
mechanism is based on homomorphic anonymous tokens 
and enables S to identify dishonest clients even dishonest 
events can be detected only after S had completed its 
services. In addition to these mechanisms, a linear 
equation based encryption function [4] is enhanced as the 
base for implementing the 2nd method. 
In the remainder, it is assumed that an appropriate 
anonymous authentication mechanism is available. 
Therefore before proposing the mechanisms, firstly 
anonymous authentication mechanisms are discussed. 
II. MECHANISMS FOR ANONYMOUS AUTHENTICATION 
Anonymous authentication mechanisms enable a server 
to authenticate authorized clients without knowing their 
identities; they must satisfy the following requirements, 
i.e. 
1) only authorized clients are successfully authenticated, 
2) no one except a client itself can know the identity of 
the client that is being authenticated,  
3) no one except a client itself can know that its past 
authentication requests are made by the same client, 
4) qualifications of clients must be invalidated when 
they secede from the system managed by the server 
that provides the services, and 
5) the server can handle clients that lose or forget their 
secrets necessary for being authenticated. 
A mechanism based on anonymous tokens discussed in 
Sec. II-A satisfies the 1st, 2nd, and the 3rd requirements, 
and a one based on ID lists discussed in Sec. II-B satisfies 
the all of the above requirements. 
A. Anonymous token based autentication 
Server S can authenticate authorized clients by giving them 
tokens that are numbers with signatures of S, i.e. only 
authorized clients can show tokens with S’s signatures. 
Anonymous tokens are also numbers with the signatures of S, 
however different from usual tokens S does not know the 
numbers on which it had signed. Therefore, clients can 
maintain their identities secret from S. Conditions that ensure 
anonymous tokens to work well are,  
1)  tokens are unique, and  
2)  a client can use each of its token only once. 
If clients Cp and Cq can obtain the same token T, server S 
cannot determine that T is used in authorized ways by Cp or Cq, 
or T is given to unauthorized entities by them. Also, if Cp can 
use a single same token multiple times, it can give its tokens to 
other entities without any penalty. When the above conditions 
are ensured, anonymous tokens bring a substantial advantage to 
anonymous authentication mechanisms. Namely, different from 
the conventional password based authentication, in which non-
qualified clients can be successfully authenticated as authorized 
ones by acquiring passwords from qualified clients, in a 
mechanism based on anonymous tokens, clients cannot disclose 
their tokens to other entities without losing their qualifications. 
  
When client Cp discloses its token T to other client Cq, although 
Cq can be authenticated as an authorized one, Cp cannot use T 
anymore.  
Client C can obtain its anonymous token from server S 
based on the blind signature scheme [1],[2]. Firstly, C picks its 
n-th token T(C, n) from the token table prepared by S 
anonymously. Here, the token table maintains available tokens 
while publicly disclosing them through e.g. a bulletin board 
(BB) which is readable by anyone at any time, and when T(C, 
n) is picked by C, S signs on it by its signing key a. Then 
because only tokens with signatures generated by key a are 
valid and S does not sign on T(C, n) repeatedly, tokens become 
unique. Here, signatures generated by key a are different from 
those generated by the blind signature scheme based on signing 
key b. Signing key a is only for making tokens unique, and 
even unauthorized clients can obtain signatures generated by a, 
therefore notation T(C, n) is used for representing also T(C, n) 
with this signature. Also because even unauthorized entities 
can pick tokens in the token table, S must fill the token table 
with tokens more than they are actually required. However, S 
does not need to worry about dishonest events caused by tokens 
picked by unauthorized entities; tokens are valid only when 
they have S’s signatures generated by key b.  
To obtain the signature generated by signing key b, client C 
encrypts T(C, n) by its secret key c to E(c, T(C, n)) and shows 
it with its (n-1)-th signed token S(b, T(C, n-1)) to S. Then, S 
signs on E(c, T(C, n)) by its signing key b to generate S(b, E(c, 
T(C, n))), when S(b, T(C, n-1)) is not used repeatedly and has 
the correct signature of S, and finally, C decrypts S(b, E(c, T(C, 
n))) to S(b, T(C, n)). Here, S(b, T(C, n)) is the signature of S on 
C’s n-th token T(C, n), i.e. no one except S can generate S(b, 
T(C, n)) and S can confirm that C is the authorized entity by 
checking the consistency of S(b, T(C, n)), however, S cannot 
identify C from it because S had signed on its encrypted form. 
Also, because S checks duplicated uses of S(b, T(C, n-1)), C 
can use S(b, T(C, n)) only once. As the exception, C obtains the 
signature on its initial token E(c, T(C, 1)) by showing its 
authenticity while disclosing its identity, and it is assumed that 
signing and encryption functions S(b, x) and E(c, x) are 
commutative of course. Fig.1 shows the anonymous token 
based authentication procedure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Anonymous token based authentication 
A serious drawback of anonymous token based 
authentication mechanisms is that server S does not have any 
information about links between clients and their tokens; 
therefore problems arise when clients lose their qualifications, 
or forget or pretend to forget their tokens. Namely, firstly client 
C that loses its qualification still can use its token, and secondly 
C that obtains its new token while pretending to forget its token 
can use its old token. About the former problem, S can collect 
tokens from clients that secedes from the system while carrying 
out the client deregistration procedures in which clients return 
their unused signed tokens, however when clients secede from 
the system without carrying out the procedures, they still have 
effective tokens, and moreover they can obtain new tokens 
forever by refreshing them. Theoretically the both problems 
can be solved by invalidating all tokens that S had signed on. 
Here, S can find all signed tokens easily by examining the 
token tables. However this solution is apparently impractical 
because even irrelevant clients are asked to obtain their new 
tokens. Expiration times attached to tokens may mitigate the 
problem, but still clients can use invalid tokens until their 
expiration times, and also the clients can obtain new tokens by 
showing old tokens. The worse thing is that expiration times 
may suggest identities of token owners. 
B. ID-List based Authentication 
An ID-List based authentication mechanism [3] removes 
drawbacks of the anonymous token based one. Authentication 
processes proceed as shown in Fig. 2. Firstly, client Ch 
generates D, a list of IDs of randomly selecting clients that 
includes dh, the ID of Ch, and sends D to server S as its 
authentication request. After receiving the request with D, S 
generates its random bit string R, and for each dj in D, it finds 
password pj in its database that corresponds to dj and encrypts 
each pj to pj = E(k, pj) by its public encryption key k to 
calculate qj = (pj  R). Here, although entities other than Cj 
know public key k they do not know its decryption key k-1, 
therefore they cannot know pj, password of other client Cj, 
from E(k, pj). After calculating qj, S develops P a password list 
consists of {dj, qj} pairs to send it to Ch with R = E(k, R). Then, 
Ch that receives P, calculates ph’ = E(k, ph) and R’ = (qh  ph’) 
while finding pair {dh, qh} corresponding to its ID from P. Here, 
if Ch is the authorized client and knows its password ph, it can 
calculate ph’ and R’ so that they coincide with ph and R, 
respectively; therefore S can determine that Ch knows ph when 
it receives R as the value of R’. On the other hand, S cannot 
identify Ch provided that S assigns same random bit string R to 
all clients in the ID list, because all clients in D know their 
password and can return R as the value of R’.  
However, S can identify clients when it encrypts passwords 
of individual clients by different keys. For example, when S 
encrypts ph by key Rh unique to Ch, S can easily identify Ch 
when it receives Rh from Ch as the value of R’. Therefore a 
mechanism to force S to encrypt passwords of all clients in the 
ID list by the same key is necessary, and this is implemented 
by Ch’s calculation of R’ = E(k, R’). Namely, when R’ does not 
coincide with R, Ch can determine that S had encrypted 
passwords of different clients in the ID list by different keys, 
but when they coincide, it can believe that S had used the same 
key R to all clients. Because S does not know the exact client 
that is requesting the authentication, even when it encrypts ph, 
the password of Ch, by encryption key Rh unique to Ch, it 
cannot send E(k, Rh) as the value of R to Ch. When S uses 
different encryption keys for different clients, it must take risks 
to send R that does not coincide with E(k, Rh).  
Different from the anonymous token based mechanism, ID-
List based one can easily handle clients that lose their 
Client C 
S(b, T(C, n-1) and 
Server S 
sign on E(c, T(C, n))decrypt S(b,E(c, T(C,n))) 
verify S(b, T(C, n-1)) show current token  
to next signed token S(b, E(c, T(C, n))) 
S(b, T(C, n-1)) 
E(c, T(C, n)) 
not used repeatedly 
S(b, T(C, n)) 
encrypted next token E(c, T(C, n)) 
and confirm it is
  
qualifications or forget their secrets, because server S checks 
the qualifications of clients by their passwords that are linked 
directly to their IDs. When Ch loses its qualification or forgets 
its password, the only thing that S must do is to delete dh, ID of 
Ch, form the database or replace ph, password of Ch, in the 
database with newly declared one.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  ID-List based authentication 
Possible threats to the ID-List based mechanism that must 
be considered are 1) password disclosure from password list, 
and 2) identifications of frequent visiting clients. About the 1st 
threat, different from usual authentication systems, in this case, 
dishonest client Cj can try to estimate passwords of other client 
Ch infinite times without being noticed by server S, e.g. Cj 
includes dh, an ID of Ch, in the ID list when it requests 
authentication, assumes possible passwords of Ch such as its 
birth date, telephone number, etc. and encrypts them by using 
publicly known key k to compare the result with the value in 
the password list. An ID-List based mechanism protects clients 
from this kind of password disclosures by exploiting function 
G(gh, ph) that transforms passwords so that different passwords 
may have the same transformed forms, where ph is the 
password of Ch and gh is a secret bit string shared by S and Ch 
and attached to dh at Ch’s membership registration time. 
Namely, in Fig. 2, password ph is firstly transformed to G(gh, 
ph), then it is encrypted to E(k, G(gh, ph)) finally to be XORed 
by S’s secret random bit string R. Therefore, S generates the 
password list while calculating qh = E(k, G(gh, ph))  R. Then, 
client Cj that knows its own password pj tries to steal ph in the 
following way. Firstly, it calculates E(k, G(gj, pj)) to know R = 
{E(k, G(gj, pj))  qj}, and extract E(k, G(gh, ph)) by calculating 
qh  R, then generates E(k, G(gh1, ph1)) while assuming gh1 and 
ph1 as the values of gh and ph, to compare the result E(k, G(gh1, 
ph1)) with E(k, G(gh, ph)). However, because multiple pairs, e.g. 
{gh1, ph1} and {gh2, ph2}, may satisfy relations E(k, G(gh, ph)) = 
E(k, G(gh1, ph1)) and E(k, G(gh, ph)) = E(k, G(gh2, ph2)), Cj 
cannot determine if ph1 or ph2 is the correct password of Ch or 
not even E(k, G(gh1, ph1)) and E(k, G(gh2, ph2)) coincide with 
E(k, G(gh, ph)); and Cj’s authentication request at other server 
S’ may be rejected, and when S and S’ are communicating, S 
can notify Ch that someone is trying to use its ID and password 
to suggest Ch to change its password. Here, to protect password 
ph securely, N(ph) the number of passwords that are 
transformed into the same form G(gh, ph) must be large, i.e. the 
probability that entities successfully use their steeling ph is 
1/N(ph).  
The 2nd problem is a one that dh, ID of frequently visiting 
client Ch, appears many times in ID lists accompanying 
individual authentication requests, and S can identify Ch as a 
frequent visiting client, although it cannot identify clients that 
requesting individual authentications. Aliases are the solution 
to mitigate this problem. Namely, Ch can decrease the 
appearance of dh in the ID lists even it requests authentications 
frequently by using different alias ID and password pairs at its 
individual visits to S. However, different from non-anonymous 
systems, in anonymous authentication systems, server S must 
invalidate all aliases of client Ch without knowing links 
between Ch and these aliases, when Ch loses its qualification, 
e.g. when Ch secedes from the system. Also, links between 
aliases of same clients must be hidden from any entity except 
the clients themselves; when these links are known to S, S can 
easily know existences of frequently visiting clients. These 
mechanisms can be implemented by using implicit transaction 
links [4]. 
III. MECHANISMS FOR IDENTIFYING DISHONEST ENTITIES 
Anonymous authentication mechanisms discussed in the 
previous sections enable S to authenticate authorized 
clients without identifying clients themselves, however 
clients can behave dishonestly without any penalty once 
they are authenticated successfully. This section discusses 
mechanisms to identify clients that behave dishonestly 
after they were authenticated. 
A. Anonymous Token 
Anonymous tokens used in the anonymous token based 
authentication mechanism can be directly used to identify 
dishonest clients provided that S can detect dishonest 
events while the clients are receiving services. Namely in 
Fig. 1, when S does not give the n-th token to C until it 
can confirm the honest behavior of C, C can obtain its n-
th token only if it is honest. Therefore although C can 
receive services from S at its (n-1)-visit to S by using 
token T(C, n-1), after that it cannot receive any service 
from S. Moreover, when S inquires clients of their last 
tokens, C can show only its used token because it had 
shown T(C, n-1) already at its (n-1)-th visit and did not 
receive its new token. On the other hand, honest clients 
always possess their unused tokens because they show 
their tokens in exchange for their new tokens. Then S can 
identify dishonest client C as the client that cannot show 
its unused token. However, S cannot know any privacy of 
honest clients from unused tokens that they show at the 
requests of S because they did not receive any service by 
using these tokens. 
However, S cannot identify dishonest clients when 
dishonest events are detected after it had completed its 
services, i.e. S cannot decide whether C is honest or 
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find {dh, qh} in P and  
generate R and  
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dishonest at a time when C leaves from S. Therefore S 
must sign on C’s next token, and C can show its unused 
token when S inquires of its unused token. 
B. Homomorphic Anonymous Tokens 
When tokens in the previous subsection are homomorphic, 
S can identify dishonest clients, even if it can detect dishonest 
events only after the clients leave from S. A homomorphic 
anonymous token is a one that is encrypted by a token holder 
while using homomorphic encryption function. Namely, token 
holder C encrypts its token S(b, T(C, n)) signed by server S to 
E(c, S(b, T(C, n))) by its encryption key c, where, E(c, x) is a 
homomorphic encryption function and b is a signing key of S. 
As same as anonymous tokens, S(b, T(C, n)) must be 
constructed so that no one except C can identify C from it. 
However, different from the anonymous token scheme, in the 
homomorphic anonymous token scheme, it is not necessary for 
C to conceal its tokens at times when it obtains signatures on 
them. C can obtain its tokens also while hiding its identity 
without concealing them. In the followings, encryption 
function E(c, x) is assumed to satisfy E(c, x) + E(c, y) = E(c, 
x+y), i.e. E(c, x) is homomorphic under addition. 
S identifies dishonest client C as follows. Firstly, at 
anonymous client C’s n-th visit to S, S asks C to show its n-th 
token S(b, T(C, n)) and the encrypted (n+1)-th token (i.e. 
homomorphic anonymous token E(c, S(b, T(C, n+1)))), that are 
not used before, where C obtains S(b, T(C, n)) and S(b, T(C, 
n+1)) from S through the other independent process and 
encrypts S(b, T(C, n+1)) to E(c, S(b, T(C, n+1))) by its secret 
encryption key c in advance. Then, C receives services from S 
and S memorizes triple {SID, S(b, T(C, n)), E(c, S(b, T(C, 
n+1)))} as the service record, where SID is the identifier of the 
service that S had provided. When dishonest events are 
detected in the service corresponding to SID, S asks all clients to 
decrypt E(c, S(b, T(C, n+1))), and C is identified as a dishonest 
one, because C that knows decryption key c-1 can decrypt E(c, 
S(b, T(C, n+1))) to S(b, T(C, n+1)), the consistent signature of 
S, on the other hand, the decryption result of honest client D is 
E(d-1, E(c, S(b, T(C, n+1)))) that does not have consistent 
meanings. The important thing is that E(d-1, E(c, S(b, T(C, 
n+1)))) does not include any information about the service that 
D had received, i.e. a homomorphic anonymous token does not 
reveal any privacy of honest client D. 
Here, although dishonest C tries not honestly to decrypt 
E(c, S(b, T(C, n+1))) of course, homomorphic property of 
encryption function E(c, x) disables that. Because E(c, x) 
is additive, when S asks C to decrypt test = w1E(c, Tc1) + 
w2E(c, Tc2) + --- + wmE(c, Tcm) + w0E(c, S(b, T(C, n+1))), 
the decryption result must coincide with test = w1Tc1 + 
w2Tc2 + --- + wmTcm + w0S(b, T(C, n+1))*, if C had 
answered S(b, T(C, n+1))* honestly as the decrypted form 
of E(c, S(b, T(C, n+1))). Here, {E(c, Tc1), E(c, Tc2), ---, E(c, 
Tcm)} are encrypted forms of test bit strings Tc1, Tc2, ---
Tcm that are registered by C in advance, and w1, w2, ---, wm, 
w0 are random bit strings secret from C. Then, S can 
decide that C decrypts E(c, S(b, T(C, n+1))) dishonestly to 
S(b, T(C, n+1))* when the decrypted form of test does not 
coincide with test. Namely, when E(c-1, E(c, S(b, T(C, 
n+1)))) ≠ S(b, T(C, n+1))*, C that does not know w1, w2, ---, 
wm, w0 cannot decrypt test to test. On the other hand, 
when S(b, T(C, n+1))* is the correct decrypted form of E(c, 
S(b, T(C, n+1))), C can calculate test by simply decrypting 
test without knowing any of w1, w2, ---, wm, w0. However, 
the above scheme does not work correctly when C had 
dishonestly encrypted S(b, T(C, n+1)) from the beginning. It 
must be noted that S cannot use test bit strings to confirm the 
correct encryption of S(b, T(C, n+1)), because S must know 
the encrypted test bit strings {E(c, Tc1), E(c, Tc2), ---, E(c, 
Tcm)} that differ from those of other clients to verify 
correctness of encryptions, i.e. to enable S to find the test bit 
strings corresponding to C, C must inform S of its identity. 
ITLs (Implicit Transaction Links) [4] enable S to force C also 
to encrypt S(b, T(C, n+1)) honestly without identifying C. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Used token record UTR(C, n) 
To disable C to encrypt S(b, T(C, n+1)) dishonestly, S 
generates used token record UTR(C, n) consists of 4 items, i.e. 
visit counter, service identifier, current token, and next token, 
as shown in Fig. 3, and encrypts it to E(kS, UTR(C, n)) by its 
secret encryption key kS to be maintained by C. Here, E(kS, x) is 
an additive (homomorphic) encryption function as same as E(c, 
x). The visit counter represents the number of visits that C had 
made before including the current one, service identifier SID(n) 
represents the service that C had received at its n-th visit to S, 
and current token S(b, T(C, n)) and encrypted next token E(c, 
S(b, T(C, n+1))) are multiplied by the token concealers vn and 
vn+1 that are secret of S so that C cannot modify or forge pair 
{vnS(b, T(C, n)), vn+1E(c, S(b, T(C, n+1)))} consistently. It 
must be noted that, the value of the visit counter must be 
initialized when it exceeds the relatively small value defined in 
advance, to disable S to extract frequently visiting entities. 
Here, pair {vnS(b, T(C, n)), vn+1E(c, S(b, T(C, n+1)))} is an 
ITL at C’s n-th visit, and S inquires sums of encrypted used 
token records from individual clients periodically, e.g. at times 
when S collect fees for its providing services. Therefore, S can 
calculate the sums of current and encrypted next tokens of C by 
decrypting the sum of encrypted records that C had reported by 
exploiting the additive property of E(kS, x), and because 
encryption function E(c, x) is also additive, S can calculate the 
sum of next tokens by asking C to decrypt the sum of encrypted 
next tokens. Then, based on the fact that the sums of current 
and next tokens are equal provided that the difference between 
the initial and the last tokens is compensated, S can detect 
dishonest token encryptions of C. Namely, although C can 
dishonestly encrypt S(b, T(C, n+1)) to X at its n-th visit to S, at 
its (n+1)-th visit, C must show token S(b, T(C, n+1)) 
accompanied by the consistent signature that is not encrypted 
to X, and as the consequence, S generates C’s (n+1)-th used 
token record UTR(n+1) as UTR(n+1) = {n+1, SID(n+1), vn+1S(b, 
T(C, n+1)), vn+2E(c, S(b, T(C, n+2)))}, however S had 
generated UTR(n) as UTR(n) = {n, SID(n), vnS(b, T(C, n)), 
vn+1X} at C’s n-th visit. Then, S detects inconsistency between 
S(b, T(C, n+1)) and X at a time when it collect fees from C for 
Current token Next token 
vnS(b, T(C, n)) vnE(c, S(b, T(C, n+1))) n 
Visit counter Serveice ID 
SID(n) 
  
its providing services, i.e. the sum of current tokens and that of 
next tokens do not coincide. 
As a conclusion, client C is identified as a dishonest one 
through one of the following reasons, i.e. firstly C decrypts E(c, 
S(b, T(C, n+1))) to consistent S(b, T(C, n+1)) at a time when S 
detects dishonest events, or secondly, at a time when S 
calculates the sum of used token records of each client, C 
cannot decrypt the sum of encrypted next tokens so that it 
coincides with the sum of current tokens.  
In the above, ITLs disable C to report the sum of its service 
records dishonestly, e.g. while modifying, forging, or deleting 
its records, based on the relation that the sums of current and 
next tokens must be same [4]. At its n-th visit to S, C cannot 
report n, the number of its past visits to S, dishonestly either. 
IV. LINEAR EQUATION BASED ENCRYPTION FUNCTION 
A. Basic Mechanism 
A linear equation based encryption function E(Q, M) 
encrypts bit string M by representing M as a H-dimensional 
integer vector {M} = {m1, m2, ---, mH} and linearly combining 
its elements by using linearly independent (H x H) secret 
coefficient matrix Q = {qij} to generate H-dimensional vector 
{M*} = {m*1, m*2, ---, m*H} as shown in (1). 
m*1 = q11m1 + q12m2 + ---- + q1HmH 
m*2 = q21m1 + q22m2 + ---- + q2HmH 
                                      ----                                        (1) 
 
m*H  = qH1m1 + qH2m2 + ---- + qHHmH 
 Then, an entity that does not know Q cannot calculate M 
from {M*}; however when Q is disclosed, anyone can calculate 
M from {M*} by solving (1). Therefore, {M*} is the encrypted 
form of M, and matrices Q and Q-1 are considered as encryption 
and decryption keys, respectively. Encryption function E(Q, M) 
is homomorphic under addition, i.e. when M1 and M2 are 
encrypted into E(Q, M1) and E(Q, M2), then sE(Q, M1) + tE(Q, 
M2) is decrypted into sM1 + tM2, where s and t are arbitrary 
integers. However this property introduces a serious drawback 
that it is weak against plain text attacks. When H mutually 
independent H-dimensional vector {A1*}, {A2*}, ---, {AH*} are 
given as encryption results of known bit strings A1, A2, ---, AH, 
because arbitrarily given H-dimensional vector x* is 
represented as x* = g1A1* + g2A2* + ---- + gHAH*, x* can be easily 
decrypted into x = g1A1 + g2A2 + ---- + gHAH even coefficient 
matrix Q is not known.  
B. Protecting Encryption Function  from Plain text Attacks 
The drawback of the linear equation based encryption 
finctions can be excluded by the following 3 ways, i.e. 
1) by inserting secret random dummy elements at random 
positions in the encrypted vector, 
2) by adding secret random terms to (1), and 
3) by representing the value of each element of the encrypted 
vector as the sum of values randomly split into multiple 
elements. 
The 1st method mixes vector {m*1, m*2---, m*H}, which is 
calculated from M according to (1), with secret random vector 
{w*1, w*2, ---, w*T} while shuffling the elements of both vectors 
to generate a single (H+T)-dimensional vector; therefore the 
encryption result becomes to {M*’} = {w*2, w*1, m*3 w*3, m*1---, 
w*5} for an example. As the consequence, to decrypt {M*’} into 
M, positions where m*1, m*2---, m*H are located in {M*’} must 
be determined. However, there are still linear relationships 
among encrypted forms of known bit strings when dummy 
elements are removed, and it is not so difficult to identify the 
positions where elements {m*1, m*2---, m*H} are allocated.  
To make the linear relationships among encrypted forms 
difficult to be identified, the 2nd method adds G secret random 
bit strings r1, ---, rG to {m1, m2, ---, mH}. Therefore, M is 
represented as (H+G)-dimensional vector M = {m1, m2, ---, mH, 
r1, r2, ---, rG}, and key Q is extended to (H+G) x (H+G)-matrix 
Q, i.e. M is encrypted to M* = {m*1, m*2, ---, m*H+G} by using 
secret coefficient matrix Q, and M* is decrypted into M by 
solving the linear equation and deleting random bit strings r1, r2, 
---, rG. The important thing is that r1, r2, ---, rG are kept as 
secrets of the entity that encrypts M and they are changed at 
every encryption. Therefore, although there are still linear 
relationships among encrypted forms of known bit strings, it is 
extremely difficult to use them for estimating the encryption 
key.  
However, it must be noted that the 2nd method cannot 
protect encrypted forms without the 1st method. When (H+G) 
linearly independent encrypted forms of known bit strings {M1*, 
M2*, ---, MH+G*} are fortunately obtained, any entity can 
decrypt arbitrary encrypted form M* by decomposing it into a 
linear combination of {M1*, M2*, ---, MH+G*}. When M* is 
decomposed into a1M1* + a2M2*, --- + aH+GMH+G*, although it is 
not possible to identify random secret numbers r1, r2, ---, rG that 
are used for calculating M*, M itself can be reconstructed as M 
= a1M1 + a2M2, --- + aH+GMH+G, provided that Mj* is the 
encrypted form of Mj for each j.  
In the 3rd method, the value of each element m*j of the 
encrypted vector is randomly split into a set of multiple 
elements {m*j1, m*j2---, m*jp} so that relation m*j = m*j1 + m*j2 + 
--- + m*jp is satisfied, i.e. single element m*j is represented as a 
set of elements {m*j1, m*j2---, m*jp}. Therefore, linear 
relationships between encrypted forms of known bit strings 
totally disappear, and plain text attacks become impossible. 
Because linear relationships among encrypted forms are hidden, 
all possibilities that {m*1, m*2---, m*H} are allocated in an 
(H+T)-dimensional vector must be examined to calculate the 
coefficient matrix, i.e. (H+T)PH number of possibilities must be 
examined. When H and T are set to 50, (H+T)PH becomes 100P50 > 
2500, and this can be increased by adding more dummy 
elements. Also for individual possible arrangements, extracting 
linear relationships among encryption results of known bit 
strings is extremely difficult because of the 2nd and the 3rd 
methods. When the coefficient matrix is given, LU-
decomposition method [5], for example, solves linear equations 
with sufficient performance in terms of both computation speed 
and accuracy even when the dimensions of coefficient matrices 
are more than 1,000. 
  
C. Protecting Encryption Function form Forgeries 
Although the above methods protect the encryption 
function from plain text attacks, it is still easy to generate 
consistent encrypted forms without knowing the key. By 
linearly combining encrypted forms of known mutually 
independent bit strings, encrypted forms of arbitrary bit strings 
can be generated, and entities can behave dishonestly while 
modifying or forging encrypted forms in unauthorized ways, as 
same as in cases where public key encryption functions are 
used. The following mechanism disables entities to modify or 
forge encrypted forms of bit strings in unauthorized ways. 
The basic idea is to attach a check code (CC) and a check 
value (CV) to bit string M to be encrypted as shown in Fig. 4. 
Here, values of the CC and the CV are determined as the secret 
of entity P that encrypts M, and P changes their values 
randomly in every encryption so that C and V, the values of the 
CC and the CV, satisfy V = f(C). Therefore, when E(Q, M), the 
encrypted form of M, is generated in unauthorized ways, P can 
detect that by checking if V = f(C) is satisfied or not. For 
entities that do not know C and V, it is difficult to generate E(Q, 
M) while satisfying V = f(C) even if they know function f(x). 
 Here, to protect encrypted forms, f(C) must be a nonlinear 
function. If it is a linear function, e.g. V = sC + t (s and t are 
constant values), it is not so difficult to generate consistent 
encrypted forms of given bit strings without knowing the 
encryption key by lineally combining already known encrypted 
forms. On the other hand, it is desirable that f(C) is linear to 
exploit advantages of the additive property. When it is linear, 
the consistency of a set of n encrypted forms can be confirmed 
by checking the sum of the encrypted forms in the set without 
checking individual encrypted forms, and more importantly 
without knowing individual data.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.  A check code and a check value 
The CC and CV shown in Fig. 5 satisfy both of the above 
requirements. In the figure, CC is configured as a set of Z 
integers {CC1, CC2, ---, CCZ} with values 0 or 1, and P defines 
their values randomly so that only one of CCj has 1 as its value. 
The value of CV is defined according to CCj to which value 1 
is assigned. Namely, a set of values V1, V2, ---, VZ are 
corresponded to CC1, CC2, ---, CCZ in advance, and the CV 
value is calculated as Vj when CCj is 1. Then the relation 
between values of the CC and the CV is not linear anymore, 
and entities cannot generate consistent encrypted forms by 
combining those of already known bit strings, e.g. when an 
entity generates pE(Q, M1) + qE(Q, M3), its CC = {CC1, CC2, --
-, CCZ} may have multiple nonzero elements. On the other 
hand, P can convince itself that a set of given encrypted forms 
are consistent ones without checking values of the CC and the 
CV of individual forms. When the sum of the encrypted forms 
is decrypted, P can extract Tj, the sum of CCj values for each j, 
and W, the sum of CV values, and all encrypted forms in the 
set are consistent when W = T1V1 + T2V2 + --- + TzVz is 
satisfied.  
By using the additive property, linear equation based 
encryption algorithms can be made also verifiable as shown in 
Sec. III-B, namely entity can confirm the correctness of 
encryptions while using test bit strings without knowing either 
of the encryption or the decryption keys.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Configuration of CC and CV 
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